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EFFECTUATING THE CUSTOMER'S RIGHT




The provisions of Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code'
relating to a customer's right to stop payment 2 of an item appear,
at first blush, to be clear and straightforward. In fact, these
provisions have generated confusion and left the customer at the
tender mercies of his bank. When the bank properly honors a stop
payment order, the mechanism of the Code works splendidly. The
bank returns the item unpaid, 4 and has no liability to its customer5
or the holder.6 Ultimate liability in the underlying transaction is
resolved between the drawer and holder. 7
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law.
The author wishes to thank Professors Monique C. Lilard and Dennis C.
Colson of the University of Idaho College of Law for their very helpful comments
on earlier drafts of this article, and Karl Beus, University of Idaho, College of
Law, Class of 1992, for his helpful research assistance. The author also wishes
to acknowledge the helpful comments of Professor John F. Dolan, Wayne State
University, notwithstanding his disagreement with the thesis of this article.
1. Unless otherwise noted, all references to the "Uniform Commercial
Code," "U.C.C.," or "Code" are to the 1989 Official Text. References to
"Article 4" are to Article 4 of the Code.
2. Principally U.C.C. §§ 4-403 and 4-407, but also § 4-401.
3. As one court has noted, "the current provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code [relating to the customer's right to stop payment] create
ambiguity, inconsistency, conflict and confusion. As a result no clear-cut judicial
determination has yet been made to harmonize the provisions, the statutory design
and the realities of the practical commercial world." Thomas v. Marine Midland
Tinkers Nat'l Bank, 86 Misc. 2d 284, 288, 381 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (Civ. Ct.
1976).
4. U.C.C. §§ 4-301, 4-302 (1989).
5. Dishonor is not wrongful in such a case because the item is not properly
payable. U.C.C. § 4-402; see infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
6. The item does not act as an assignment of the drawer's funds, and the
bank has no liability prior to acceptance. U.C.C. § 3-409 (1989).
7. Id. § 3-802.
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Serious problems arise, however, when the bank fails to honor
a valid and effective stop payment order.8 Upon payment of the
item, the bank will inevitably charge the customer's account.9 As
a result of this charge, the customer loses the use of the funds
until the bank recredits the account.'0 The customer's belief in the
effectiveness of the stop order exacerbates the situation because
the customer is likely to continue drawing checks against funds he
assumes are available, with the distinct possibility that these checks
will be dishonored for insufficient funds.
Current constructions of the Code frustrate the customer's
ability to obtain an immediate recredit to his account. The Code
imposes no explicit obligation on the bank to recredit the custo-
mer's account," and expressly places the burden of proving the
8. This article addresses the customer's right to obtain immediate recredit
following payment of an item by a bank over a valid and timely stop order. It
proceeds on the assumption that the stop payment order given by the customer
to the bank is complete, accurate, and timely. With the proliferation of com-
puterized check processing, however, the question of the efficacy of the stop
payment order has been litigated frequently. See Norwood, Bank Liability for
Failure to Stop Payment, 106 BANKjNG L.J. 527 (1989); Graziano, Computerized
Stop Payment Orders Under the U.C.C.: Reasonable Care or Customer Beware?,
90 COM. L. J. 550 (1985); Lakin, Stop Payment Orders: What Hath the Uniform
Commercial Code Wrought?, 63 Ky. L.J. 299, 303-16 (1975). To eliminate the
issue of the efficacy of the stop order itself, the terms "stop," "stop order,"
and "direction to stop," as used in this article, mean a valid, timely, and effective
order to stop payment as contemplated by U.C.C. § 4-403(1) (1989).
It should be noted that there are many, particularly in the banking com-
munity, that view the customer's right to stop payment as pernicious and abusive.
Whether, as a matter of policy, the right to stop payment should be eliminated
is beyond the scope of this article. Certainly, reasonable minds may differ about
whether a right arising in a simpler, slower era of bank collections is appropriate
in today's high volume, automated, check-collection process.
This article, however, takes as a given the decision of the drafters to include
the right to stop payment, and the recent decision to continue this right. U.C.C.
§ 4-403 (1990). Given that the right to stop payment is granted by the Code, it
is the position of this article that such a right should be made truly effective, to
the extent possible consistent with the structure and policy of the Code, to protect
the rights of the customer, his bank, and third parties.
9. This results from the highly automated process of check clearing.
U.C.C. § 4-103 comments 1 & 3 (1989); see infra note 82 and accompanying
text.
10. See infra note II1 and accompanying text.
11. U.C.C. § 4-401(1) provides that "[als against its customer, a bank may
charge against his account any item which is otherwise properly payable from
that account even though the charge creates an overdraft." U.C.C. § 4-401 (1989)
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fact and amount of loss on the customer. 2 Accordingly, the bank
can maintain the charge against the customer's account and force
the customer to bear the burden of commencing litigation to
recover. 13 This state of affairs unfairly penalizes the customer and
runs contrary to the Code policies underlying the right to stop
payment.1
4
Although recent decisions have attempted to ease the custo-
mer's burden of proving loss once litigation has commenced, 15 the
benefits of such analyses remain unavailable to the customer who
does not or cannot litigate. To fully effectuate the right to stop
payment, the customer must have the ability to force the bank to
recredit his account without the necessity of litigation. Professor
Alces has noted:
The average check, according to a 1982 report, is drawn
for $570. This amount may be significant to individual
consumers, but is not likely to justify economically the
drawer's initiation and prosecution of a lawsuit against the
drawee that has paid over a stop order. In many instances,
the amount of a wrongfully paid check might exceed the
(emphasis added). Although the section makes no express provision for the bank's
right to charge an account with respect to an item which is not properly payable,
the negative inference is that no such right exists.
12. U.C.C. § 4-403(3) provides that "[t]he burden of establishing the fact
and amount of loss resulting from the payment of an item contrary to a binding
stop payment order is on the customer." Id. § 4-403(3). Under current "accepted
wisdom," the construction of this provision operates to make a bank's payment
of an item contrary to a binding stop order somehow "properly payable." See
infra Part III. Therefore, the bank's charge to the customer's account is valid
until the customer satisfies this burden of proof. See infra notes 89-92 and
accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
14. U.C.C. § 4-403 comment 2 (1989) sets forth the clear policy to protect
the customer's right to stop payment as follows:
The position taken by this section is that stopping payment is a
service which depositors expect and are entitled to receive from banks
notwithstanding its difficulty, inconvenience and expense. The inevitable
occasional losses through failure to stop should be borne by the banks
as a cost of the business of banking (emphasis added).
This policy continues the historical protections accorded the customer's right to
stop payment, see infra Part III, and is further supported by the fact that
payment of an item over a valid stop order is an improper, wrongful payment.
Id. §§ 4-403 comment 8, 4-407 comment 1.
15. See infra notes 37-55 and accompanying text.
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state's small claims court jurisdictional limit and yet be
insufficient to justify the litigation expense and delays
inherent in a standard tort or contract case. Certainly, were
the litigation postures reversed, it is unlikely that a payor
bank would initiate an action to recover its wrongful pay-
ment of the average check.
16
Under prevailing interpretations of section 4-403, the customer
confronted with a payment over a valid stop order faces two,
interrelated problems. First, the customer has lost the use of funds
debited from his account following payment of the stopped item.
This results from the lack of an express duty on the part of the
bank to recredit the account when presented with evidence by the
customer of the bank's failure to honor the valid stop order.
This inability to obtain a pre-litigation recredit leads to the
customer's second problem. If the bank's payment discharged a
valid obligation of the customer, prevailing interpretations of
section 4-403(3) indicate that the customer will be unable to prove
the requisite "loss" under that subsection in order to recover from
the bank. Such a narrow interpretation of "loss" under section 4-
403(3) fails to recognize the bank's breach of the bank-depositor
contract, and forecloses recovery of "secondary losses," such as
loss of credit or subsequent check dishonors resulting from the
bank's initial wrongful payment of the stopped item.
By recognizing and giving effect to the forgotten section 4-
401, the bank's initial wrong is corrected through recredit. If the
bank does not recredit voluntarily, the bank's breach continues to
afford the customer the ability to recover all damages flowing
therefrom.
The simplest solution to the customer's plight is to amend the
Code to provide for an explicit duty on the part of the bank to
recredit the customer's account following payment over a valid
stop order. Unfortunately, the recently proposed revisions to Ar-
ticles 3 and 4 do not include such a provision.1 7 Accordingly, this
16. Alces, Toward a Jurisprudence of Bank-Customer Relations, 32 WAYNE
L. REv. 1279, 1285-86 (1986) (citing ARTHuR D. LrrrnE, INC., IssuEs AND NEEDS
iN THE NATION'S PAYMENT SYsmM 12, table 1 (1982)). See also infra note 116
and accompanying text.
17. Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 3-Negotiable Instruments
(With Conforming and Miscellaneous Amendments to Articles 1 and 4), 1990




article will provide an analytical pathway through the maze of
apparently conflicting Code provisions which impact a customer's
right to stop payment. The text of the Code provides the customer
with a right to have his account immediately recredited following
payment over a valid stop order without the burden of litigation,
while protecting the rights of the bank to recover the amount paid
in order to avoid unjust enrichment of the customer or other
parties. Such application of the Code protects the rights of both
the customer and the bank, simultaneiously preserving and ad-
vancing the policies of the Code.
Part II of this article will discuss the currently accepted wisdom
regarding the proper construction of the customer's right to stop
payment under section 4-403. Part III will review briefly the history
of a customer's right to stop payment and his recourse against the
bank for failure to stop. Part IV will proceed to an analysis of
the "forgotten" section 4-401, and will show that this section
provides an answer to the customer's dilemma regarding recredit
following an improper payment. In Part V, a holistic analysis of
sections 4-403, 4-407, and 4-401 will demonstrate that the custo-
mer's right to stop payment can be effectuated without the loss
of legitimate protections of the bank.
II. Tim "AccEPTED WISDOM"
The dilemma for the customer whose stop order has not been
honored lies in the operation of the text of section 4-403,18 as
construed by courts and commentators. "The U.C.C. takes the
position that the drawer of a check is entitled to stop payment
thereon," and further provides that "[t]o mitigate the severity of
that rule on banks, . . . the customer has the burden of proving
any loss resulting from the payment of a check contrary to a stop
18. U.C.C. § 4-403 (1989) provides:
(1) A customer may by order to his bank stop payment of any item
payable for his account but the order must be received at such time and
in such manner as to afford the bank a reasonable opportunity to act
on it prior to any action by the bank with respect to the item described
in Section 4-303.
(2) An oral order is binding upon the bank only for fourteen
calendar days unless confirmed in writing within that period. A written
order is effective for only six months unless renewed in writing.
(3) The burden of establishing the fact and amount of loss resulting
from the payment of an item contrary to a binding stop payment order
is on the customer.
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payment order."'' 9 This is the generally accepted wisdom concerning
the approach to the provisions of section 4-403.m This approach
leaves the customer with the initial burden to litigate the issue of
a recredit, because the bank can rely on the provisions of section
4-403(3) and require the customer to prove the loss. More impor-
tantly, if taken to its logical conclusion, this analysis forecloses
the customer from recovering ancillary losses resulting from the
improper payment, such as the wrongful dishonor of subsequent
checks or the loss of credit, unless the customer establishes some
defense to the stopped item or the transaction out of which it
arose. 2' In the absence of such a "real loss,"" any other damages23
will not be recoverable. 24
19. H. BAILEY, BRADY ON BANK CHECKs (P) 23.21 at 23-44 (6th ed. 1987).
20. Id. at 23-46.
21. See, e.g., Thomas, 96 Misc. 2d at 289, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 800-01 (cus-
tomer's liability on the item continues because the payee is a holder in due
course; also, bank can assert the contractual rights of the payee or holder on
the underlying transaction as a set-off to customer's claim). See also infra notes
83-92 and accompanying text.
22. Id. at 289, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
23. For purposes of this article, losses sustained by the customer relating
to the stopped item and the transaction out of which the stopped item arose will
be referred to as "primary losses." Other damages, such as those resulting from
the wrongful dishonor of subsequent checks, loss of credit or, generally, the loss
of the use of the funds by the customer, will be referred to as "secondary
losses." These labels are used solely for clarity and should not be considered as
indicative of any substantive distinction between the types of loss. Indeed, it is
the premise of this article that no distinction should be made between the types
of loss or damage flowing from the bank's wrongful payment over a stop order.
24. See infra notes 84-92 and accompanying text. Professors White, Sum-
mers, and Clark adopt this view. J. WHITE & R. SUmMERs, Ui, roim COMMERCIAL
CODE 797-98 (3d ed. 1988); B. CLARK, THE LAW OF BANC DEPosrrs, COLLECTIONS
AND CREDIT CARDS (P) 2.06(2) (3d ed. 1990). Certainly, for a customer to recover
damages for payment over a valid stop order, the customer, like any aggrieved
party, must prove its loss. The "accepted wisdom" regarding the proper con-
struction of Section 4-403(3), however, improperly restricts, to primary losses,
the "loss" which must be shown. This construction (1) fails to recognize the
wrongfulness of the bank's action in paying over the stop order, U.C.C. § 4-
401; and (2) eliminates any incentive for the bank to voluntarily recredit the
customer's account to avoid potential liability for secondary losses, because this
construction effectively limits the bank's potential liability to an amount not
exceeding the amount of the item. See NicKLEs, MATBESON AND DoLAN, MATE-
RIALS FOR UNDERSTANDING CREDIT AND PAYMENT SYSTEMS, Teacher's Manual
312-13 (West 1987). The construction proposed herein avoids this result, but does




An early New York decision, Cicci v. Lincoln National Bank
& Trust Co.,25 involved an action by a customer under section 4-
403 following her bank's wrongful payment over a stop order.
The court denied the customer's motion for summary judgment.
The court summarized its analysis as follows:
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
in New York .. . there was no question that a depositor
who issued to his bank a timely stop payment order could
recover against the bank for a breach of the depositor's
order by payment of the check in absence of any ratification
of the bank's payment by the depositor .... [A] bank after
breaching its depositor's instructions to stop payment on a
check could not involve him against his will in litigation
with a third party in order that the bank could recoup a
potential loss resulting from its own error .... [Prior to
adoption of the Code,] it appears to have been well settled
law ... that a prima facie case was made out by the
depositor against the bank for breach of a timely stop
payment order on a check, in the absence of ratification,
without any allegation of damage. The plaintiff's complaint
and the moving papers herein do not even allege ... any
damage by virtue of the bank's breach other than the fact
that the plaintiff's account with the defendant bank has
been reduced by $3,000.00 [the amount of the wrongfully
paid check].
[The Court quotes Section 4-403(3).] The plaintiff urges
that he is damaged by reason of the fact his bank account
has been reduced by $3,000.00. This contention is without
merit because if it were adopted there would be no reason
or purpose for the enactment of subdivision (3) of section
4-403 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
26
In conclusion, the court held that:
[W]here a depositor and maker [sic] of a check moves for
summary judgment pursuant to Section 4-403 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code it is part of the. plaintiff's prima
facie case to allege and thereafter, of course, to prove that
25. 46 Misc. 2d 465, 260 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Syracuse City Ct. 1965).
26. Id. at 468, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 102-03 (emphasis added).
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he has been damaged by reason of the bank's wrongful
payment of a check after receipt of a timely and proper
stop payment order .... 27
While the court in Cicci construed section 4-403(3) technically,
the court did not address the question of what type of damages
constitutes a loss which the customer must allege and prove under
section 4-403(3). In a pre-Code case that relied on the imminent
Code for support, the court suggested that the loss must be a
primary loss, i.e., must relate to the instrument stopped, and/or
the underlying transaction. In Universal C.L T. Credit Corp. v.
Guaranty Bank & Trust Co.,21 customer sued payor bank for
recredit following payment over a valid stop order. Although the
court acknowledged the customer's absolute right to stop payment,
the court analyzed the status of the depositary-presenting bank as
a holder in due course (HIDC). Because the presenting bank
qualified as an HIDC and the court recognized the right of the
payor to be subrogated to the rights of the HIDC,29 the court held
that "C.I.T [customer] is not allowed to recover because it has
not borne its burden of showing that it suffered loss from [payor
bank's] disregard of the stop payment order; C.I.T suffered no
loss because it would have been liable to [depositary-presenting
bank] as a holder in due course in any event." 30 The court's
reasoning indicates that the loss which must be established under
section 4-403(3) is a primary loss on the stopped instrument or
related transaction.
The reasoning of these early decisions has been adopted in
more recent cases. Such decisions construe section 4-403(3) to place
the burden on the customer to prove his loss before recovering
against the payor bank for wrongful payment. Further, these
decisions suggest that the loss must be a primary loss relating
directly to the stopped item or to the transaction underlying the
stopped item. In Mitchell v. Republic Bank & Trust Co. ,'31 the
court stated:
There is no case law in this state, and nothing in the
Official or North Carolina Comments, which defines "loss"
27. Id. at 468, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 104.
28. 161 F. Supp. 790 (D. Mass. 1958).
29. U.C.C. § 4-407(a) (1989).
30. 161 F. Supp. at 794-95.
31. 35 N.C. App. 101, 239 S.E.2d 867 (1978).
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as used in [section 4-403(3)]. We conclude that, where the
bank pleads non-loss by the bank customer, a bank cus-
tomer, in order to recover for damages caused by the
bank's payment of a check contrary to a valid stop payment
order, must show some loss other than the mere debiting
of his bank account in the amount of the check. Otherwise
there would appear to be no reason for the enactment of
[section 4-403(3)].32
If the "mere debiting" of the account is insufficient to support
an action under section 4-403(3), the question becomes whether
any losses flowing from that "mere debiting," e.g., wrongful
dishonor of subsequent checks, constitute sufficient loss under
section 4-403(3) to support the customer's right to recover.
In another recent case, Southeast First National Bank of Satellite
Beach v. Atlantic Telec, Inc.,33 the court outlined the structure of
the customer's case and the bank's response as follows:
Simply because a bank pays a check over a stop pay-
ment order does not entitle the customer to recover damages
against the bank, but it does establish a prima facie case
for the customer. The bank must present evidence to show
absence of loss, or the right of the payee of the check to
receive payment. Then the customer must sustain the ulti-
mate burden to show why there was a defense to payment
of the item.
34
This statement makes clear that the loss which the customer must
prove under section 4-403(3) relates to the stopped item. That is,
the customer must show a defense to payment to prove that he
has suffered a "loss" under section 4-403(3).
31
Although the foregoing analysis of the customer's burden of
proof appears to be supported by the language of section 4-403(3),
32. Id. at 103, 239 S.E.2d at 869. The court adopted the procedural structure
relating to burdens of proof under Thomas v. Marine Midland Tinkers Nat'l
Bank, 86 Misc. 2d 284, 381 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Civ. Ct. 1976); see infra notes 38-45
and accompanying text.
33. 389 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980), petition denied, 397 So.
2d 779 (Fla. 1981).
34. Id. at 1033 (emphasis added).
35. See also Kunkel v. First Nat'l Bank of Devil's Lake, 393 N.W.2d 265,
267 (N.D. 1986) (customer must show some loss other than the "mere debiting
of his bank account" resulting from payment over stop).
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the harshness of the requirement that the customer show some loss
relating to the item or the underlying transaction has led to a
softening of this burden by some courts. As Professor Rubin has
noted, "In several cases, the courts have focused on the somewhat
scholastic distinctions between the burden of going forward and
the burden of proof.... "36 While adopting a plain-reading inter-
pretation of section 4-403(3), the Mitchell and Telec decisions
37
followed the seminal case of Thomas v. Marine Midland Tinkers
National Bank38 regarding the allocation of burdens of proof to
soften the effect on the customer. In Thomas, following a trial in
which the customer proved payment by the bank over a valid stop
order, the bank "virtually rested on [the customer's] case,"' 30
neither asserting a defense nor adducing any real evidence what-
soever. The court recognized that:
The burden imposed upon the customer by . . . Section 4-
403(3)... would appear to be inconsistent with the overall
policy expressed in subdivision (1) of this section of the
Code that the depositor's right to stop payment is a service
to which he is entitled without regard to any inconvenience
or occasional loss to the bank, and such right need not be
predicated on proof of sound legal grounds. 40
To effectuate this policy underlying the right to stop payment,
the court established the following analytical framework regarding
the burden of proof placed on the customer by section 4-403(3),
and the bank's right of subrogation under section 4-407. First, the
customer must establish the validity of the stop order and the fact
of payment by the bank with a corresponding charge to the
customer's account. 41 Such a showing establishes the customer's
prima facie case for recovery.42 The bank must then come forward
with evidence demonstrating a non-loss by the customer. 43 Upon
36. Rubin, Policies and Issues in the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and
4 of the U.C.C., 43 Bus. LAW. 621, 659 (1988).
37. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
38. 86 Misc. 2d 284, 381 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Civ. Ct. 1976).
39. Id. at 287, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
40. Id. at 288-89, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 800; see infra note 112 and accompanying
text.
41. 86 Misc. 2d at 290, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 801-02.




the entry of such evidence by the bank, "the customer must sustain
the ultimate burden of proof on the issue of loss."
44
Such an analysis arguably strengthens the customer's ability to
obtain a recredit; however, two problems remain. First, such a
benefit only arises in the litigation context. The bank remains in
a position to assert that because the customer cannot sustain his
ultimate burden, he is not entitled to a recredit. More to the point,
the nature of the loss which the customer must establish remains
unclear. The immediate loss to the customer and the focus of the
customer's action under section 4-403 relate to obtaining a recredit
to his account. The propriety of a recredit per se involves the
customer's rights in relation to the item itself and the underlying
transaction. Yet this focus leads to the myopic view that fails to
take into account further losses resulting from the charge. To
properly analyze the competing rights and obligations of the cus-
tomer and his bank, the issues relating to the bank's right to make
and maintain the charge to the customer's account must be sep-
arated from the customer's right to recover damages caused by
the wrongful payment, which may or may not include the amount
of the item improperly paid.
4
1
It is remarkable that in none of the cases so far discussed did
the court even mention section 4-401. In Siegel v. New England
Merchants National Bank,4 the Supreme Judicial Court of Mass-
achusetts considered the interplay of section 4-401 with sections 4-
403 and 4-407. In Siegel, the bank prematurely paid a post-dated
check of its customer, the drawer-depositor. In a suit brought by
the customer's executrix for improper payment, the court analo-
gized to the rights of the parties following payment over a valid
stop. The court held that the customer had a valid claim for
44. Id., 381 N.Y.S.2d at 802.
45. See supra note 23. Without a clear delineation between the bank's
culpability in paying over a valid stop order and the customer's damage, both
primary and secondary, flowing from the payment, the "accepted wisdom"
regarding the operation of § 4-403(3) precludes the customer from recovering all
losses and damages flowing from the bank's breach of contract. See Phillips,
The Commercial Culpability Scale, 92 YALE L.J. 228 (1982). When a bank pays
over a valid stop order, and the customer's valid obligation is discharged and no
other secondary losses result from the payment, the customer cannot recover
damages. Under current constructions of 4-403(3), however, the customer cannot
recover any losses resulting from the payment, if payment of the item by the
bank either satisfied or discharged a valid obligation of the customer. This result
ignores the customer's right to stop payment and precludes recovery of valid
losses flowing from the bank's breach of this right. See infra Part V.
46. 386 Mass. 672, 437 N.E.2d 218 (1982).
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wrongful payment, but that the bank was entitled to be subrogated
to the rights of the payee and any other holder on the item.47 The
court held that "the bank must recredit the depositor's account,
but may then assert against the depositor any rights acquired by
prior holders on either the instrument or the transaction from
which it arose." 41
The court explained the issue as a question of loss to the
customer. The bank, although not entitled to debit the account
for an item that is not "properly payable," asserted by way of
defense that because the payment discharged a legal obligation of
the customer, there had been no loss which the customer was
entitled to recover. 49 To resolve this dispute, the court stated:
[Tihe code fixes the rights of the bank and the depositor
by a two part adjustment. The depositor has a claim against
the bank for the amount improperly debited from its ac-
count, and the bank has a claim against the depositor based
on subrogation to the rights of the payee and other holders.
The bank may assert its subrogation rights defensively when
its depositor brings an action for wrongful debit.-0
The Siegel decision is somewhat inconsistent. In analyzing
section 4-403(3), the court reasoned that between the bank and
the customer, the customer is in the best position to prove losses
resulting from payment over the stop: "The depositor, who par-
ticipated in the initial transaction, knows whether the payee was
entitled to eventual payment and whether any defenses arose.
Therefore section 4-403(3) requires that he, rather than the bank,
prove these matters. 51 If this is the meaning of 4-403(3), then it
appears that until such a defense on the underlying transaction is
established, the customer will not have satisfied its burden under
section 4-403(3), and the debit to the account can stand.5 2
In its summary of the interplay between sections 4-401, 4-403,
and 4-407, the court stated, however, that "[tihis view of the three
relevant sections of the code suggests a fair allocation of the
burden of proof. The bank, which has departed from authorized
47. Id. at 681, 437 N.E.2d at 224.
48. Id. at 673, 437 N.E.2d at 220 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 675, 437 N.E.2d at 221.
50. Id. at 676, 437 N.E.2d at 221-22 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 678, 437 N.E.2d at 222.
52. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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bookkeeping, must acknowledge a credit to the depositor's ac-
count. 513 The bank must then carry the burden to establish its
subrogation rights, including "the status of the parties in whose
place it claims."m Finally, "the [customer] must then prove any
facts that might demonstrate a loss.""5 This procedural framework
suggests that the bank's wrongful debit constitutes the initial
wrong, and any losses flowing from that debit would be sufficient
to demonstrate loss under section 4-403(3). Yet it remains unclear
whether the bank has any obligation to its customer to recredit
the account prior to the joinder of all issues in litigation.
The technical reading of the requisite loss that must be proven
under section 4-403(3) found in the foregoing analyses fails to
address two interrelated issues. First is the issue of the propriety
of the bank's charge of the customer's account following payment
over a valid stop order. Proper analysis of the first issue then
reveals the necessity to address the scope of the term "loss" as
used in section 4-403(3). If it is concluded that the charge was
improper in the first instance, then any secondary losses flowing
from the wrongful act must be recoverable regardless of the lack
of any primary loss on the stopped item and the underlying
transaction.
III. THE CUSTOMER'S RIGHT TO STOP PAYMENT-HISTORY
A. Pre-Code Theory and Rules Regarding the Right to Stop
Prior to the Code, the courts had developed clear, logical rules
regarding the customer's right to stop payment. The contract
53. 386 Mass. at 678, 437 N.E.2d at 222-23 (emphasis added).
54. Id., 437 N.E.2d at 223. It may be suggested that Siegel places the bank
in the untenable position of having to prove facts of which it has no knowledge,
e.g., the existence and rights of the payee or other holder or holder in due course
to which it seeks subrogation. However, this is a burden borne by any party
seeking rights of subrogation. As a subrogee under section 4-407, the bank must
establish the existence and rights of its subrogor. Further, this is not unwarranted
because the bank has no less knowledge of the existence of such parties than
does the customer.
The customer must carry the burden of proving his damages, both primary
and secondary, because he is in the best position to have access to such evidence.
As to the rights of other parties to which the bank may claim subrogation,
however, the customer is in no better position than the bank to establish such
facts. Section 4-407 properly places the burden on the bank to establish its rights
of subrogation.
55. Id. at 679, 437 N.E.2d at 223.
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between the customer and the bank was defined as a debtor-
creditor relationship.5 6 This contract required the bank to honor
all valid and proper orders of the customer to pay amounts from
his account with the bank, for as long as funds remained available
in the customer's account. The customer's order, however, re-
mained executory and could be rescinded until the bank made
payment.57 Upon receipt of a timely stop payment order, the bank
ceased to have authority to pay the item.58 Because the bank-
customer contract permitted the bank to pay only authorized
orders, payment over the stop payment order constituted a breach
of contract.5
9
The customer established the bank's breach by proving the
timeliness and validity of the stop order.6 Prior to the Code and
upon such a showing, the bank was strictly liable for the amount
paid out over the stop order.6' The bank's negligence, or lack
thereof, was irrelevant to the fact that a breach occurred and the
customer had lost the funds paid out.62 Consequently, the bank
was obligated to recredit the customer's account in the amount
paid out over the stop. Further, because any debit to the account
was a breach of contract, damages for subsequent items dishonored
as a result of the wrongful debit were recoverable. This result
logically follows from the foreseeability of such damages by the
bank, if its wrongful payment and debit reduced the account
balance and resulted in insufficient funds returns of subsequent
items.
As holder of the funds, the bank retained the ability to force
the customer to litigate to recover. Yet, the existence of a clear
rule imposing initial liability on the bank exposed the bank to
potential liability over and above the amount of the item debited.
56. 6 C. ZoLLmANN, BANKs AND BANKING §§ 3701, 3710 (1936); TmIFANY
ON BANKS AND BANKIrN §§ 41, 42 (1912); Hawkland, Stop Payment Orders
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 Com. L.J. 53, 59 (1970); Homer, The
Stop Payment Order, 2 BAYLOR L. REv. 275, 286-87 (1950); Comment, Stop
Payment: An Ailing Service to the Business Community, 20 U. Cm. L. REv.
667, 668 (1953); Note, Stop Payment and The Uniform Commercial Code, 28
IND. L.J. 95 (1952); Symons, The Bank-Customer Relation: Part I-The Rele-
vance of Contract Doctrine, 100 BANK. L.J. 220, 222-23 (1983).
57. See supra note 56; see also U.C.C. § 4-303 (1989).
58. C. ZoiumANN, supra note 56, § 3701, at 108.
59. See supra note 56.





Such potential liability provided strong incentives to the bank to
recredit the customer's account and to pursue litigation to recoup
losses at a later time.63
Banks responded to such potential liability by attempting to
disclaim liability for failing to honor stop orders through excul-
patory clauses. Such clauses were generally unenforceable prior to
the Code,64 and remain unenforceable under the Code.65 Banks
further claimed a right to maintain the charge following payment
over a valid stop on the grounds that by retaining the benefits of
the underlying transaction, the customer had ratified the bank's
payment over the stop order."
Banks were able to obtain some relief in a few jurisdictions
under the theory of equitable subrogation. 67 Although in the ab-
sence of ratification, the bank was strictly liable for payment over
a valid stop order, some courts recognized that such a result could
operate to unjustly enrich the customer by leaving the customer
with both the consideration in the underlying transaction and the
price paid. Consequently, a minority of courts allowed the bank
to assert a claim against its customer or the merchant-payee by
way of a separate action for equitable subrogation. The bank's
assertion of this right was wholly separate from the issue of the
bank's right, in the first instance, to charge the customer's account.
The bank simply did not have the authority to charge the account.
68
Accordingly, on the eve of the drafting of the Code, the
customer's right to stop payment was absolute. In the absence of
ratification, the bank had no right to charge the customer's account
and could only obtain relief in a minority of jurisdictions by way
of a separate, independent claim of subrogation.
B. The Early Drafts of the Code
The Code drafters initially proceeded to codify the absolute
liability of the bank for payment over a valid stop order.69 They
63. For example, the bank may have been entitled to recover from its
customer under the theory of ratification. See Chase Nat'l Bank v. Battat, 297
N.Y. 185, 78 N.E.2d 465 (1948). Also, the bank was accorded certain rights to
be subrogated to the rights of the customer, payee, or other holder to prevent
unjust enrichment. Homer, supra note 56, at 286-87.
64. 1 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n. 1954 Report at 463 (1954); see also
Comment, The Stop Payment Order-A Potential Pandora's Box for the Drawer,
39 ALB. L. REv. 252 (1975); Note, supra note 56; Homer, supra note 56, at 275.
65. See supra note 64; U.C.C. § 4-103(1).
66. See supra notes 56, 63. This defense is maintained under U.C.C. § 4-
403 comment 8.
67. See supra notes 56-66.
68. See Homer, supra note 56, at 286-87.
69. "A payment in violation of an effective direction to stop payment is
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also codified the bank's right of subrogation to avoid the potential
for unjust enrichment. 70 The drafters, however, specifically pro-
hibited the bank from charging a wrongful payment to the cus-
tomer's account. 7' At this point, the Code retained the significant
distinction between the bank's ability to charge the customer's
account and the bank's ability to recoup potential losses through
subrogation.72
The basic structure of the provisions relating to the bank-
customer relationship took form in the September 1950 revisions
to Article 4.73 Section 4-501 specifically permitted the bank to
charge items which were "properly payable" to the account of its
customer. 74 Section 4-503 codified the customer's absolute right to
stop payment, and section 4-507 codified the bank's rights of
an improper payment, even though it is made by mistake or inadvertence, and
it may not be charged to the drawer's account.... ." U.C.C. § 4-203 comment
8 (Proposed Final Draft, Spring 1950), reprinted in 10 E. KELLY, UNiFom
COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTs 494-95 (1984) [hereinafter U.C.C. DRAFTS] (emphasis
added).
70. Id. § 4-402(4), reprinted in 10 U.C.C. DRArrs at 533. That section
provided in relevant part:
(4) To prevent unjust enrichment a payor bank which has paid an item
drawn or made by a customer and which it may not charge to 'his
account may in an action
(a) against the holder who has received payment recover any part
of the payment due its customer or any prior party in respect of the
transaction in which the customer of the depositary bank acquired the
item; and
(b) against its customer recover any amount which would have been
due from him on the item if payment had been refused.
The bank has no right to charge the customer's account in respect of
such cause of action.
Id. (emphasis added).
Comment 5 to that section stated:
Subsection (4) gives a bank a right to recover by action where it
has paid a validly drawn item over a stop-order or in other circumstances
not permitting a charge to the account.... The section does not permit
a charge to the account requiring the bank's rights to be established in
an action or other proceeding.
Id. § 4-402 comment 5, reprinted in 10 U.C.C. DRArs at 534-35 (emphasis
added).
71. See supra note 69.
72. Id.
73. U.C.C. Article 4, Part 5 (Revisions, Sept. 1950), reprinted in 11 U.C.C.
DRArs at 381-85.
74. Id. § 4-501, reprinted in 11 U.C.C. DRnIrs at 381. This is the first
time the drafters included an explicit provision regulating the right of the payor
bank to charge the customer's account.
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subrogation.7 5 Section 4-507 continued the bank's right to recover
as subrogee of the holder or the customer, but only by way of a
separate action.76 The September 1950 revisions continued the
premise that payment over a valid stop could not be charged to
the customer's account, although the bank may have had a cause
of action, as subrogee, to recoup amounts necessary to prevent
unjust enrichment.
The stop payment provisions of Article 4 took a dramatic turn
between the September 3, 1951 draft and the November 1951 Final
Text Edition.7 7 In an effort to placate banking interests, which
had been unsuccessful in obtaining validation of exculpatory clauses
or limiting the efficacy of oral stop payment orders,7 8 the drafters
for the first time incorporated section 4-403(3). In the November
1951 Draft, the burden of establishing loss was placed on the
customer under section 4-403(3),' 9 and the bank's right of subro-
gation was not limited to realization via a separate cause of
action.80
75. Id. §§ 4-503, 4-507, 11 U.C.C. DarArs at 381, 383-84.
76. Id. § 4-507, 11 U.C.C. DRAi-rs at 383-84.
77. Compare Uniform Commercial Code Article 4: Bank Deposits and
Collections, Superseding August 1951 Revision, Text Edition (September 3, 1951),
reprinted in 12 U.C.C. DRants at 360-64, and Uniform Commercial Code: Final
Text Edition (November 1951), reprinted in 12 U.C.C. Danrrs at 554-57.
78. See N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Study of Uniform Commercial Code:
Memoranda Presented to the Commission and Stenographic Report of Public
Hearing on Articles 3 and 4 of the Code, Legis. Doc. 65(C), 1 N.Y. Law Revision
Comm'n 1954 Report 187-548, particularly testimony of Walter D. Malcolm at
467-68 (1954).
79. Section 4-403(3) provided, "The burden of establishing the fact and
amount of loss resulting from the payment of an item contrary to a binding stop
payment order is on the customer." U.C.C. § 4-403(3) (Final Text Edition,
November, 1951), reprinted in 12 U.C.C. DRArrs at 555.
80. Section 4-407 provided,
If a payor bank has paid an item over the stop payment order of the
drawer or maker or otherwise under circumstances giving a basis for
objection by the drawer or maker, to prevent unjust enrichment and
only to the extent necessary to prevent loss to the bank by reason of
its payment of the item, the payor bank shall be subrogated to the
rights
(a) of any holder in due course on the item against the drawer or
maker; and
(b) of the payee or any other holder of the item against the drawer
or maker either on the item or under the transaction out of which the
item arose; and
(c) of the drawer or maker against the payee or any other holder
1991]
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
The 1952 draft of the Code8' provided commentary explaining
this drastic change. Comment 9 to section 4-403 noted that, upon
payment of an item over a valid stop, banks make a charge against
the customer's account in the ordinary course. 82 Because the cus-
tomer bears the burden of establishing the loss resulting from
payment over a stop order, the bank is not obligated to recredit
the customer's account until the customer satisfies this burden. 3
These provisions placed the burden of litigating on the customer
in the absence of an ability to obtain a voluntary recredit by
"satisfying" the bank that a loss resulted from the bank's error.
The significance of the change wrought by the November 1951
draft lies in the manner in which the customer obtained recourse
for a wrongful payment over a valid stop order. Under the common
law rule and the initial drafts of the Code, the customer's right
to obtain recredit was absolute; the bank lacked the right to charge
the customer's account, and any damages flowing from the wrong-
ful charge were recoverable, regardless of the rights or obligations
of the customer on the item or the underlying transaction. Placing
the burden of establishing loss on the customer created an ano-
malous situation in which the customer could not recover for
damages flowing from the charge to its account unless he first
of the item with respect to the transaction out of which the item arose.
U.C.C. § 4-407, reprinted in 12 U.C.C. DRArs at 557 (emphasis added).
This provision is identical to the current section 4-407. Note that the provision
no longer refers to a payment which the bank may not charge to the account of
the customer. Moreover, there is no language limiting the bank's right of
subrogation. The right is simply granted to the bank. Cf. U.C.C. § 4402(4)
(Proposed Final Draft, Spring, 1950), reprinted in 10 U.C.C. DRArs at 533. See
supra note 69.
81. Uniform Commercial Code (Official Draft, 1952), contained in volumes
14 & 15 of Kelly's U.C.C. DRAxrTs.
82. Comment 9 provided:
When a bank pays an item over a stop payment order, such payment
automatically involves a charge to the customer's account. Subsection
(3) imposes upon the customer the burden of establishing the fact and
amount of loss resulting from the payment. Consequently until such
burden is maintained either in a court action or to the satisfaction of
the bank, the bank is not obligated to recredit the amount of the item
to the customer's account and, therefore, is not liable for the dishonor
of other items due to insufficient funds caused by the payment contrary
to the stop payment order.




established a primary loss on the item in a judicial proceeding. 4
Comment 9, however, was deleted from the Code without
explanation in the 1957 draft of the Code."5 Both the author of
comment 9, Walter D. Malcolm, and the Editorial Board of the
1955 draft of the Code considered comment 9 merely a "logical
extension" of the rule set forth in section 4-403 .16 On the other
hand, the New York Law Revision Commission, in its study of
Article 4, was not convinced of the propriety of comment 9. The
Commission stated,
Subrogation to a right to enforce [an item under section
4-407] is not the same thing as a right to charge the
customer's account .... Comment 9 [to section 4-403]
states that until [the customer satisfies its burden under
section 4-403(3)] the bank is not obligated to recredit the
customer's account. It is not clear that the rule indicated
in this Comment 9 does result from the text of Section 4-
403(3).87
These disparate interpretations of the impact of section 4-403(3)
on the bank's liability for subsequent losses following a debit after
payment over a valid stop order provide little instruction on the
current effect of section 4-403(3). On the one hand, the deletion
of comment 9 may indicate the drafters' ultimate agreement with
the Law Revision Commission. Yet, deletion of comment 9 may
have been a means by which to avoid conflict with the New York
Commissioners and allow the courts to interpret section 4-403(3)
to its "logical conclusion." Based on current analyses by the
courts,88 it appears that the view of the Editorial Board in 1955
has prevailed.
84. See Lakin, supra note 8, at 320 (loss which must be established by the
customer under section 4-403(3) is tied to the drawer's "rights against the payee
or other holder").
85. U.C.C. § 4-403 Official Draft with Comments 1957, reprinted in 19
U.C.C. D Ans at 448-50.
86. See testimony of Walter D. Malcolm, 1 N.Y. Law Revision Commission
1954 Report at 467-8 (1954); see also Supplement No. 1 to the 1952 Official
Draft 145 (1955), reprinted in 17 U.C.C. DRArrs at 463.
87. 2 N.Y. Law Revision Commission 1955 Report at 339 (1955).
88. See supra Part II.
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Indeed, Professor Clark characterizes the effect of section 4-
403(3) in a manner consistent with former comment 9:
This completely mysterious § 4-403(3) means that the drawee
bank would not be liable for wrongful dishonor of subse-
quent checks, checks that would have been honored if the
stop order had been followed. Until the customer satisfies
his burden of proof in a court under § 4-403(3), the item
is presumably properly payable.Y
Apparently Professors White and Summers agree with such an
analysis. They posit a hypothetical in which a customer sues his
bank for payment over a valid stop order and the wrongful
dishonor of subsequent checks.9 Where "the court finds that the
payee had no good cause of action," the court will order a recredit
and also rule in favor of the customer regarding his action for
wrongful dishonor. 91 However:
If the bank-customer litigation [under 4-403(3)] comes
out the other way (by subrogation under 4-407 bank shows
that its subrogee-payee or other holder-had a good cause
of action against customer) ..... The bank as subrogor
sustains its right to debit the account notwithstanding the
stop order. Having sustained this right with respect to the
first check, it follows that the bank may dishonor checks
subsequently presented against insufficient funds.92
IV. THE FORGOTrN SECTON 4-401
Conspicuous by its absence in the foregoing analysis is any
reference to section 4-401. 91 The analyses of both Professor Clark
89. B. CLARK, supra note 24, (P) 2.06(2) at 2-100.
90. J. Wmm & R. SuMmRs, supra note 24, at 797.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 797-98 (emphasis added).
93. Section 4-401(l) provides that "[a]s against its customer, a bank may
charge against his account any item which is otherwise properly payable from
that account even though the charge creates an overdraft." U.C.C. § 4-401(1)
(1989) (emphasis added).
It may be argued that the general provisions of § 4-401 have been superseded
by the specific provisions of § 4-403(3). Section 4-401, however, addresses the
bank's right to charge its customer's account. Section 4-403 says nothing about
the bank's right to charge an account, but rather addresses the customer's rights
and obligations concerning a stop order.
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and Professors White and Summers indicate that the initial wrong-
ful charge to the account following a payment over a valid stop,
can somehow be validated retroactively if the customer fails to
show some "right" to stop the item in question. The difficulty,
however, with such analyses derives from two factors. First, the
bank has no authority to charge an item to the customer's account
which is not properly payable to the customer's account.9 Second,
payment over a valid stop is wrongful. 95
Nothing in the Code changes the basic relationship between
the customer and the bank. The bank is permitted to pay and
charge only authorized orders of its customer. 96 A check is an
executory order of the customer until payment or acceptance by
the bank. 97 In the event a timely and effective stop order is received
by the bank, any authority to pay the item and charge the account
is revoked.9 Accordingly, regardless of the customer's rights vis-
i-vis the payee or holder, the bank lacks the authority to pay the
item or, more importantly, to charge the customer's account. To
prevent unjust enrichment to the customer, the bank is given rights
of subrogation to recover the amount of the item paid.19
Moreover, the Code does not displace other common law
defenses and rights developed to equitably allocate losses on the
item and underlying transaction.10 None of these rights and de-
fenses, however, negates the initial wrongful nature of the bank's
payment and charge of the customer's account. To rectify this
problem, the bank must be obligated to recredit the customer's
account without the need for litigation and before any secondary
losses result from the charge. Further, the bank must be answerable
for such secondary damages regardless of its rights relating to the
payment of the item itself.
The Supreme Court of Ohio established a duty to recredit a
94. Id. § 4-401 (1989).
95. Comment 8 to § 4-403 states that "[a] payment in violation of an
effective direction to stop payment is an-improper payment, even though it is
made by mistake or inadvertence." Id. § 4-403 comment 8. Comment 1 to § 4-
407 reaffirms this position: "Section 4-403 states that a stop payment order is
binding on a bank. If a bank pays an item over such a stop order it is prima
facie liable ... ." Id. § 4-407 comment 1.
96. Id. §§ 4-401-402; see supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
97. U.C.C. §§ 3-409, 4-303 (1989).
98. Id. § 4-303.
99. Id. § 4-407.
100. Id. §§ 1-103, 4-407 comment 5, 4-403 comment 8.
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customer's account when a bank pays items that are not "properly
payable." In Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. First National Bank of
Akron, 10 1 the bank paid items lacking necessary indorsements. In
a broad holding, the court decided for the customer and held that
"[w]hen a bank charges an item, which is not 'properly payable'
pursuant to R.C. 1304.24 [U.C.C. § 4-401], against a customer's
account, the bank is required to recredit the customer's account
in the amount of the item."' °2 Although this holding was rendered
in a case involving payment over an invalid indorsement, the
court's analysis proceeded entirely under section 4-401:
[I]f [the bank] had examined the checks to verify that each
of the named payees had appropriately endorsed the checks,
the banks would have known that the checks were not
"properly payable" under [4-401]. Since [the bank] failed
in this regard, they breached the contract with their cus-
tomer. Thus, by the clear implication of [4-401], if the item
is not "properly payable," the bank is required to recredit
the customer's account.1 03
Given that a payment over a valid stop is an improper pay-
ment,' °4 under the rationale of the Ohio Supreme Court, the bank
must recredit the customer's account. Because this duty is imposed
on the bank, any failure to recredit will make subsequent dishonors
wrongful. By placing a duty to recredit on the bank from the
beginning, it is clear that any subsequent dishonors, loss of credit,
or other losses flowing from the wrongful debit will constitute
losses within the meaning of section 4-403(3).
An early case recognizing many of the policies protecting the
customer's right to an immediate recredit is Sunshine v. Bankers
Trust Co.05° Sunshine addressed the bank's subrogation rights
under section 4-407. In Sunshine, the payee-depositor of a check
drawn on the depositary bank sued to recover for an improper
charge-back to the customer's account following a stop order from
the drawer.' °6 Though the facts involved a charge-back to the
account of the depositor of an "on-us" item, rather than a debit
to the account of the drawer of the item, the court's reasoning
101. 63 Ohio St. 2d 220, 407 N.E.2d 519 (1980).
102. Id. at 220, 407 N.E.2d at 520.
103. Id. at 224, 407 N.E.2d at 522.
104. U.C.C. § 4-403 comment 8 (1989).
105. 34 N.Y.2d 404, 314 N.E.2d 860, 358 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1974).
106. Id. at 407-08, 314 N.E.2d at 862, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
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concerning the bank's rights as to crediting and debiting the
depositor's account are apropos. The court held that the bank's
charge-back of the item following receipt of a stop order was
untimely and hence improper.' ° The bank, however, claimed the
right of subrogation to the position of the drawer as against the
plaintiff-depositor.' °8 In this context, the court set forth reasoning
which indicates that a drawer, whose account has been charged
following a valid stop, should be entitled to an immediate recredit,
with the burden being placed on the bank to proceed by way of
subrogation to recoup any resultant loss.
The depositor asserted that the bank had no right of subro-
gation because no debit to the drawer account had been made,' °9
and accordingly, the drawer had suffered no loss to which the
bank could be subrogated." 0 In holding that the bank need not
go through a mere formality of debiting and recrediting the draw-
er's account in order to be entitled to subrogation the court stated:
When a stop-payment order has been timely given, the
party issuing the order should not lose the use of its funds.
Yet, if we were to accept the [depositor's] argument, the
bank would be compelled to debit the account of the party
issuing the stop payment as a precondition for suing as a
subrogee of that party. The "innocent" party who issued
the timely stop-payment order would then lose the use of
the funds for some time. Certainly the court should not
compel a bank to, in effect, wrongfully convert a custo-
mer's fund in order to vindicate its subrogation rights.'
The court also addressed the bank's argument regarding its
ability to avoid loss following payment over a valid stop. Although
it did address the issue of the bank's rights of subrogation against
the drawer, the court noted:
Usually, the code provides the Bank with a means of
recouping any loss it has suffered, but this is by no means
always the case. The Official Comment to section 4-403 of
107. Id. at 410, 314 N.E.2d at 863, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
108. Id. at 411, 314 N.E.2d at 864, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 120.
109. Id. at 412, 314 N.E.2d at 864, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 120.
110. Id., 314 N.E.2d at 865, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 120.
111. Id. at 412-13, 314 N.E. 2d at 865, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 121 (emphasis
added).
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the Code makes clear that a stop-payment order need not
be supported by a sound legal basis; it is, instead, a service
that must be provided by the banking industry. [The court
quotes comment 2.112
The court held that the depositor was entitled to summary judg-
ment on the issue of the bank's charge-back of the item to her
account,'1 and that "the money is now hers subject to recovery
by the Bank qua subrogee of [drawer]."11 4 Although the bank was
entitled to have the judgment stayed pending resolution of the
dispute over its subrogation rights, the stay must be accomplished
through the judicial process and not by the bank's unilateral action
of charge-back."
5
The policy behind keeping separate the charging of the account
and the bank's rights of subrogation was stated as follows:
Banks are in the unique position of holding the very stakes
for which they are contending. Respondent asserts that if
we send this case back for trial, we would in effect, allow
the Bank to be the arbiter of a dispute between two outside
parties. We are not unmindful that banks may, perhaps
even under a colorable claim of right, charge back a
depositor's account when no such right exists. The burden
on a depositor of then going forward to bring a suit is a
heavy one, and, indeed, an impossible one to bear where
the amount involved is small. Our decision should not be
interpreted to permit this result.... [O]nce the Bank loses
its right to charge back, the item becomes commingled with
the general funds of the depositor. When the Bank is suing
as subrogee, it may not at the same time make a preliminary
determination of the merits of the case by charging back
on the customer's account. So that in this case the Bank
has no more or less right to take away or freeze [deposi-
tor's] account than would the Bank's subrogor, [drawer].
112. Id. at 413 n.5, 314 N.E.2d at 865-66 n.5, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 121 n.5
(citation omitted). See also Opin. Atty Gen. Mich., No. 5947, 30 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. 1445 (1981).
113. 34 N.Y.S.2d at 414, 314 N.E.2d at 866, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 122.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 415 n.8, 314 N.E.2d at 867 n.8, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 123 n.8, where
the court states: "This, of course, should in no way prevent a bank from
obtaining an attachment of the funds or otherwise freezing them in any manner
available to it under the law." (emphasis added).
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When the Bank is acting as subrogee, it has the burden of
going forward.
116
This analysis applies to the bank's rights against its customer
after paying over a valid stop. The bank holds the stakes for
which the parties to the underlying transaction contend. The bank
has received the valid stop order of its customer, the drawer, and
by its error has paid amounts improperly. The bank's right to
recoup any loss suffered as a result is by way of subrogation under
section 4-407. The reasoning of the Court of Appeals of New York
requires that the bank recredit its customer's account upon de-
monstration that a valid stop was given and a debit wrongfully
made. The bank would then be entitled to proceed by way of
subrogation under 4-407. This would place the burden of litigation
on the bank. Of course, attachment of any funds in the account
by proper judicial process is available to the bank. The charge to
the customer's account, however, would need to be reversed."
7
One court has recognized the separate nature of the customer's
claim for recredit and the bank's rights to recoup losses as subrogee
under section 4-407, although it does so without reference to, or
reliance on, section 4-401.118 In Hughes v. Marine Midland Bank,
N.A., Judge Regan held that "the plaintiffs [customer] meet their
burden to prove loss both under the common law, and under the
code, if they show that the bank has paid out from the depositor's
account a sum of money over a valid stop order, and the loss,
both prima facie, and at trial, is that sum so paid out."" 9 The
court supported its holding by analogy to insurance subrogation:
116. Id., 314 N.E.2d at 866-67, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 122-23 (citations omitted).
117. The parallel is apt because in Sunshine the depositor would have to
demonstrate the impropriety of the charge-back. Under section 4-403(3) the
customer carries the burden to establish the loss and the validity of the stop
order. In each case, when the bank acts unilaterally to charge-back or to charge
the account, the customer has no notice that he has lost the use of the funds.
This is more problematic for the customer whose account is charged following a
valid stop. The customer making a deposit generally assumes payment but is not
entitled to rely on final payment. U.C.C. § 4-212 (1989). The customer issuing
a valid stop assumes his order will be followed, and he is in a stronger position
to claim he is entitled to rely on the presence of the funds. Requiring the bank
to proceed by legal process before freezing the account provides notice to the
customer which he does not otherwise have.
118. Hughes v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 127 Misc. 2d 209, 484 N.Y.S.2d
1000 (Roch. City Ct. 1985).
119. Id. at 215, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 1004-05.
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[W]here the carrier must pay the insured upon the event
of loss .... The carrier can sue the guilty party ... ; but
that option bears no relationship to the carrier's duty to
pay its insured under its insurance contract on a proper
proof of loss. Here the debtor-creditor contract between
the [customer] and the bank governs the bank's liability.
120
The court's rationale for its construction of the Code is summed
up as follows:
[T]he cases contain two persuasive reasons for recognizing
this sequential separateness of these causes of action: (1)
The "innocent" party who has issued a timely stop payment
order is entitled to the use of his funds pending the deter-
mination of his legal obligations in the underlying trans-
action; and (2) the cost of prosecuting the suit on the
underlying transaction may exceed the maximum possible
recovery, and it may never be brought. In such event, the
bank must bear the loss as a cost of doing business.
This Court understands that this holding allows the
depositor-plaintiff possibly to become a third-party defen-
dant in his own § 4-403 action .... But that possible
procedural posture should not, and does not, affect or alter
120. Id. at 216, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 1005. This analysis is critical. It may be
asserted that our system of vindication of rights requires that the aggrieved party
prosecute his claim before he is entitled to recovery. That is, a debtor is entitled
to retain funds allegedly owing to a creditor, until the creditor establishes his
rights via a judgment. In the present context, the purported debtor is the bank,
which is entitled to retain funds (maintain a debit to an account) until the
creditor-customer establishes his entitlement to those funds.
Yet, in the insurance context, the creditor-insured is entitled to immediate
payment on a claim without the necessity of litigating its rights under the insurance
contract. Indeed, insurers have been held liable for breach of a covenant of fair
dealing for failure to pay an apparently valid claim. Following payment, the
insurer must proceed by way of subrogation to recover from other parties which
may be liable. Indeed, one author has asserted that banks paying over valid stop
orders, when presented with evidence of a valid stop order by the customer,
should be liable in tort for breach of a covenant of fair dealing if the bank
refuses to recredit. Tabac, Countermanded Checks and Fair Dealing Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 10 ANN. Rnv. oF BANK L. 251 (1991).
It is the position of this article that such tort recovery is unnecessary and
confuses the proper functioning of the Code. Yet the insurance subrogation
analogy demonstrates that there are circumstances in which the law requires
payment to an aggrieved party when a breach of contract is demonstrated,
without the precondition of suing for judgment.
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the substantive legal relationships among all these parties,
nor ought it to confuse and merge the sequential separate-
ness of the causes of action each of these statutes has
created.
2 1
By recognizing the separate actions available to the customer
and the bank in the circumstance of a wrongful payment over a
valid stop order, Judge Regan has provided meaningful recourse
to the customer. The effect of the decision is to make clear that
charging the customer's account is wrongful. Accordingly, regard-
less of the bank's separate right and action to recoup losses, the
customer's right to recover for secondary losses is preserved.
Indeed, the court noted that one purpose of recognizing the loss
to the customer was to limit the potential damages that might
accrue to the customer and for which the bank might ultimately
be held liable.1'2
V. A COMPLETE ANALYSIS
A. The Current Code
Factoring section 4-401 into an analysis of the rights of the
customer and bank following payment over a valid stop order in
no way derogates from the proper scope and operation of sections
4-403 and 4-407. Recognition of a properly stopped item as not
"properly payable," removes any authority in the bank to charge
the customer's account. Clarifying the customer's right to an
immediate recredit provides incentive to the bank to do so. In
turn, the policy behind the right to stop payment, to cast the
occasional loss on the bank as a cost of doing business, is fulfilled.
Further, granting a recredit eliminates the potential for greater
secondary damages, thereby restricting the amount of overall dam-
ages.12
Yet the bank is not left without its remedies. Section 4-407
gives the bank the ability to recoup losses on items paid over a
valid stop order by way of subrogation to avoid unjust enrichment.
When the bank proceeds by way of subrogation under section 4-
407, the loss from payment over the stop-either in terms of the
121. 127 Misc. 2d at 217, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 1006 (citations omitted and
emphasis added).
122. Id. at 215-16 n.6, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 1005 n.6.
123. Id.
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amount of the item itself or relating to the cost of litigation-is
placed on the bank as a cost of doing business. The procedural
framework outlined in cases such as Thomas124 and Telec'25 then
comes into play. In its subrogation suit, the bank can point to
section 4-403(3) to reverse the normal burden of proof placed on
a plaintiff to prove each of the elements of its case. Under Thomas,
the customer would have the initial burden to establish the validity
of the stop order. The bank then would have the burden to
produce evidence demonstrating its right of subrogation and the
substantive right of its subrogee. Upon production of such evi-
dence, the customer would have the ultimate burden of persuading
the trier of fact that a primary loss had been suffered. In each of
these circumstances, the customer is required to prove his rights
and defenses with respect to the underlying transaction. The bank's
action for subrogation provides the appropriate forum for deciding
such issues.
On the other hand, should the bank refuse to recredit the
account, the customer's action for recredit would be brought under
section 4-403. With regard to the customer's loss on the item, the
customer only has to show the existence of a valid stop order, the
bank's payment, and the charge to his account. To the extent that
secondary losses are also claimed, the customer carries the burden
under section 4-403(3) to prove the amount of such losses. Re-
cognition of the bank's lack of authority to charge the account
under section 4-401 allows the customer to recover these secondary
losses without regard to the underlying transaction that gave rise
to the stopped item. In the event the bank seeks to recover the
amount of the item by way of subrogation under section 4-407,
the cause of action remains independent of the customer's right
to recover secondary losses under section 4-403.
The result is a crisp delineation between the coverages of
sections 4-403 and 4-407. Section 4-403, coupled with section 4-
401, pertains to the relationship between the customer and his
bank in the stop order transaction. Section 4-407 brings in the
issues relating to the substantive rights and obligations of the
parties to the transaction underlying the stopped check.
B. The Revised Articles 3 and 4
The simplest method of vindicating the customer's right to
stop payment is to amend the Code to impose a duty on the bank
124. 86 Misc. 2d 284, 381 N.Y.S.2d 797. See supra note 32.
125. 389 So. 2d 1032. See supra note 33.
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to recredit the customer's account following a wrongful payment
over a stop order. The Revised Articles 3 and 4 contained in the
1990 Official Text of the U.C.C.,' 26 however, do not go so far.
Nonetheless, the revisions to Part 4 of Article 4 do add support
for the construction of sections 4-401, 4-403, and 4-407 set forth
above.
Revised section 4-403(c) explicitly recognizes the implied ability
to recover for wrongful dishonors following payment over a valid
stop order. The section provides:
(c) The burden of establishing the fact and amount of
loss resulting from payment of an item contrary to a stop
payment order or order to close an account is on the
customer. The loss from payment of an item contrary to
a stop payment order may include damages for dishonor
of subsequent items under section 4-402.'2
The first sentence of the subsection essentially restates the
present section 4-403(3); the second sentence is new. The problem
with the addition involves its failure to indicate when wrongful
dishonor losses may be recovered. Current case law suggests that
the customer must first prove a primary loss on the item stopped
or the underlying transaction.'2 If such a loss is proven, other
secondary losses may be recovered because the customer has carried
his burden to show that the charge was wrongful. The difficulty
remains, however, as expressed by Professor Clark, that until the
customer carries his burden the item is "presumably properly
payable"' 29 and therefore chargeable to the customer's account.
Because the revision only indicates a possibility that section 4-402
damages may be recoverable, exactly what the customer's burden
is as to the loss suffered remains unclear.
The bank's rights of subrogation under section 4-407 as amended
remain substantively the same.' 30 The comments to section 4-407
also remain substantively unchanged. Curiously, the revised com-
ment 7 to section 4-403 includes a new, specific reference 3' to the
126. Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 3-Negotiable Instruments
(With Conforming and Miscellaneous Amendments to Articles I and 4), 1990
Official Text with Comments.
127. U.C.C. § 4-403(c) (1990 Official Text) (emphasis added).
128. See supra Part II.
129. B. CLAK, supra note 24, (P) 2.06(2) at 2-100.
130. See U.C.C. § 4-407 (1990 Official Text).
131. Id. § 4-403 comment 7.
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comments of section 4-407 for clarification of the interplay between
sections 4-403 and 4-407. However, no additional clarification is
provided.
Revised section 4-401 provides additional support for this anal-
ysis in its expanded definition of "properly payable." According
to revised section 4-401(a),
(a) A bank may charge against the account of a cus-
tomer an item that is properly payable from that account
even though the charge creates an overdraft. An item is
properly payable if it is authorized by the customer and is
in accordance with any agreement between the customer
and bank.132
The revision, as in the case of revised section 4-403(c), merely
makes explicit that which is already implicit under current law.
The fact remains that an item for which a customer has issued a
valid stop payment order, ceases to be an authorized item. The
revision explicitly recognizes that an item for which authorization
to pay has been withdrawn, is not properly payable. Accordingly,
the bank's authority to charge the customer's account after pay-
ment of such an item cannot be upheld. By providing express
recognition that a charge is valid only for authorized items, the
revision -supports the distinct analyses of the customer's right to
obtain recredit for an improperly charged item, and the bank's
possible rights to recoup losses via section 4-407 subrogation.
C. The Complete Analysis Applied
Two hypotheticals demonstrate the propriety of this analysis.
The basic facts are as follows:
Desktops, Inc. orders materials for the manufacture of office
furniture from Parts, Inc. Upon receipt of the goods and the
invoice from Parts, Desktops issues its check to the order of Parts
for $25,000 (the "Parts Check"), the contract price. The check is
drawn on Desktops' account at First National Bank ("Bank").
Hypothetical No. 1: Upon inspection of the goods received
from Parts, Desktops discovers certain defects which make 50
percent of the shipment unacceptable to Desktops. Desktops phones
Bank and places a stop order on the Parts Check. The oral order
is immediately confirmed in writing by Desktops, accurately setting
132. Id. § 4-401(a) (emphasis added).
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forth all pertinent information: account number, payee, check
number, date of check, and amount of check. Three days later,
the Parts Check is presented to Bank for payment, and Bank
inadvertently pays the check over the valid stop order. Upon receipt
of its monthly statement from Bank, Desktops discovers the pay-
ment of the Parts Check and the dishonor of two subsequent
checks for insufficiency of funds because of the debit to its account
in the amount of the Parts Check.
Hypothetical No. 2: Suppose the same facts as in Hypothetical
No. 1, except that the shipment from Parts conformed in all
respects to the contract between Desktops and Parts. Desktops is
experiencing cash flow problems, however, and decides to delay
payment of the Parts invoice to a later date. Desktops' management
knows that Parts' policy is to give its customers up to 6 months
to pay before commencing any action to collect the account.
Desktops issues its stop order to delay payment of the Parts invoice
to a later date when its cash flow is stronger. As a result of Bank's
payment of the Parts Check, Desktops is denied trade credit or a
working capital loan because the balance in its account with Bank
is suddenly too low.
Under the current construction of section 4-403(3), Desktops
must establish a primary loss on the Parts Check in order to
recover. Desktops will be able to establish such a loss in the first
hypothetical. In that case, the most Parts could recover from
Desktops is $12,500, 50 percent of the price of the goods under
their contract. By subrogation to the rights of Parts, Bank has a
right to recover this $12,500. Desktops, however, will be entitled
to a recredit of at least $12,500. In this case, the question then
becomes how much of Desktops' secondary losses resulting from
the dishonor of the subsequent checks will be recoverable. This
will require proof that the checks were dishonored, proof of the
time of their presentment, and proof of the damages flowing from
the dishonor of checks which would not have been dishonored had
the Bank only debited Desktops' account in the amount to which
it is entitled by subrogation, $12,500. Alternatively, Bank may
argue that the debit was proper until Desktops establishes its
primary loss. Therefore, no wrongful dishonors occurred, and
Desktops' recovery is limited to $12,500.
In the first case, the difficulty of proof is significant. Deter-
mining which checks were wrongfully dishonored and the losses
flowing from those checks is difficult. Further, to avoid liability,
the Bank, in the first instance, must make a determination of how
much of a debit is justified. The Bank ought not to be placed in
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this position, 33 nor allowed to be the arbiter of the rights of Parts
and Desktops.
The alternative case does not comport with existing analyses.
Once Desktops establishes some loss on the item, presumably the
initial debit is at least partially wrongful, and the damages for the
subsequent dishonors are recoverable. This result is now expressly
provided in revised section 4-403(c).
By recognizing that the charge to Desktops' account was wrong-
ful in the first instance, these difficulties can be avoided. The
validity of the stop order revokes the Bank's authority to charge
Desktops' account. Hence, Desktops retains the funds, and sub-
sequent dishonors are wrongful. Yet the Bank is entitled to recover,
as subrogee under section 4-407, the amount to which Parts was
entitled. This result prevents Desktops from being unjustly enriched
by retention of both the funds and the conforming goods. The
Bank suffers only damages resulting from its own wrong, and
Desktops receives the benefits of the right to stop payment provided
by the Code.
The second hypothetical further distinguishes the existing views
of section 4-403 from the position taken herein. In the second
hypothetical, Desktops has no legal right to withold payment from
Parts. That is, Desktops has no loss relating to either the Parts
Check or the underlying obligation because payment of the Parts
Check has satisfied Desktops' legal obligation to Parts. Yet, the
loss of credit to Desktops resulting from the low balance in its
account at Bank would not have occurred but for the Bank's
wrongful payment of the Parts Check and the concomitant debit
of Desktops' account. Under the current analysis, Desktops cannot
recover any losses resulting from the deprivation of credit because
it cannot establish a primary loss related to the item. Revised
section 4-403(c) does not help Desktops because secondary losses
in this case do not result from wrongful dishonor of subsequent
133. See § 4-212, comment 5. When a collecting bank negligently handles
an item and the result is the dishonor of the item, the collecting bank is still
entitled to charge-back the item against the depositor's account, without liability
beyond the amount of the check. The rationale for this is stated as follows:
"Any other rule would result in litigation based upon a claim for wrongful
dishonor of other checks of the customer, with potential damages far in excess
of the amount of the item. Any other rule would require bank to determine
difficult questions of fact." Id. § 4-212 comment 5 (emphasis added). In the
stop payment context there is no similar rule protecting the payor bank. Further,
in this hypothetical, Bank must make difficult factual determinations to make
the partial charge to Desktops' account.
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items. Desktops effectively has been deprived of the right to stop
payment granted under section 4-403.
In the context of Hypothetical No. 2, it is possible that the
damage suffered by Desktops is significantly greater than the
damage suffered in Hypothetical No. 1. Indeed, the loss of credit
may be severe enough to drive Desktops into bankruptcy. However,
such drastic consequences can be avoided. By recognizing the
Bank's lack of authority to charge Desktops' account, Desktops
is in a far stronger position to obtain recredit to its account upon
establishing the validity of the stop order. Moreover, the Bank
remains able to recover, as subrogee of Parts, the full amount of
the Parts Check. In this way, the secondary losses suffered by
Desktops are avoided, and all parties are placed in the position
they would have occupied had the stop order been properly hon-
ored by Bank. Further, the policy of the Code is served by placing
the occasional loss resulting from wrongful payments on the Bank.
V. CONCLUSION
By separating the analysis of (1) the bank's right to charge a
customer's account following payment over a valid stop order and
the customer's concomitant right to recredit, from (2) the bank's
right to recover the amount of the item where unjust enrichment
would occur, section 4-403 can be given full effect. Such a separ-
ation allows the customer to satisfy its burden under section 4-
403(3) by establishing all losses, both primary and secondary,
flowing from the wrongful payment and debit. The potential
liability for secondary losses provides incentive to the bank to
recredit the customer's account pending resolution of the issues
relating to the loss on the instrument itself. As a result, the bank
will bear the occasional loss arising from payments over stop
orders as a cost of doing business as contemplated by comment 2
to section 4-403. However, the bank still retains the ability to
recover losses from the payment of the item by way of subrogation
in situations where unjust enrichment would otherwise occur. In
such cases, the burden of litigation is initially cast on the bank,
the party whose actions caused the problem in the first place.
Further, the customer is not forced to litigate the merits of his
underlying transaction when contesting the bank's charge to his
account.
Keeping the customer's right of recourse following payment
over a valid stop order separate from the bank's right of subro-
gation is consistent with the provisions of section 4-403. It also
vindicates the rights and obligations of all parties under the code.
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